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Introduction
A novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, which is 
considered to be associated with a market in Wuhan, China, is 
now affecting a number of countries worldwide1,2. A substantial 
number of human-to-human transmission has occurred; 
the basic reproduction number R0 (the average number of 
secondary transmissions caused by a single primary case in a 
fully susceptible population) has been estimated around 2–33–5. 
More than 100 countries have observed confirmed cases 
of COVID-19. A few countries have already been shifting 
from the containment phase to the mitigation phase6,7, with a 
substantial number of locally acquired cases (including those 
whose epidemiological link is untraceable). On the other hand, 
there are countries where a number of imported cases were 
ascertained but fewer secondary cases have been reported 
than might be expected with an estimated value of 
R0 of 2–3.
This suggests that not all symptomatic cases cause a 
secondary transmission, which was also estimated to be the 
case for past coronavirus outbreaks (SARS/MERS)8,9. High 
individual-level variation (i.e. overdispersion) in the distri-
bution of the number of secondary transmissions, which can 
lead to so-called superspreading events, is crucial information 
for epidemic control9. High variation in the distribution of 
secondary cases suggests that most cases do not contribute to 
the expansion of the epidemic, which means that containment 
efforts that can prevent superspreading events have a dispropor-
tionate effect on the reduction of transmission.
We estimated the level of overdispersion in COVID-19 
transmission by using a mathematical model that is charac-
terised by R0 and the overdispersion parameter k of a negative 
binomial branching process. We fit this model to worldwide 
data on COVID-19 cases to estimate k given the reported range 
of R0 and interpret this in the context of superspreading.
Methods
Data source
We extracted the number of imported/local cases in the affected 
countries (Table 1) from the WHO situation report 3810 published 
on 27 February 2020, which was the latest report of the number 
of imported/local cases in each country (as of the situation 
report 39, WHO no longer reports the number of cases strati-
fied by the site of infection). As in the WHO situation reports, 
we defined imported cases as those whose likely site of infection 
is outside the reporting country and local cases as those 
whose likely site of infection is inside the reporting country. 
Those whose site of infection was under investigation 
were excluded from the analysis (Estonia had no case with 
a known site of infection and was excluded). In Egypt and 
Iran, no imported cases have been confirmed, which cause 
the likelihood value to be zero; data in these two countries 
were excluded. To distinguish between countries with and 
without an ongoing outbreak, we extracted daily case counts 
from an online resource11 and determined the dates of the latest 
case confirmation for each country (as of 27 February).
Model
Assuming that the offspring distributions (distribution of the 
number of secondary transmissions) for COVID-19 cases are 
identically- and independently-distributed negative-binomial 
distributions, we constructed the likelihood of observing the 
reported number of imported/local cases (outbreak size) of 
COVID-19 for each country. The probability mass function for 
the final cluster size resulting from s initial cases is, according 
to Blumberg et al.12, given by 
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If the observed case counts are part of an ongoing outbreak 
in a country, cluster sizes may grow in the future. To address 
this issue, we adjusted the likelihood for those countries 
with ongoing outbreak by only using the condition that 
the final cluster size of such a country has to be larger than 
the currently observed number of cases. The corresponding 
likelihood function is 
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growth of a cluster in a country had ceased if 7 days have 
passed since the latest reported case (denoted by set A). We 
applied the final size likelihood c(x; s) to those countries and 
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Statistical analysis
Varying the assumed R0 between 0–5 (fixed at an evenly-
spaced grid of values), we estimated the overdispersion 
parameter k using the likelihood function described above. 
We used the Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to 
provide 95% credible intervals (CrIs). The reciprocal of k was 
sampled where the prior distribution for the reciprocal was 
weakly-informed half-normal (HalfNormal(σ = 10)). We 
employed the adaptive hit-and-run Metropolis algorithm13 
            Amendments from Version 2
A typo in the equation on p80% was corrected; originally it was
80%
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1 1 NB ; , ,( )
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South Korea 1766 17 605 1144 13 27/02/2020
Japan 186 39 129 18 3 27/02/2020
Singapore 93 24 69 0 0 27/02/2020
Australia 23 20 3 0 0 26/02/2020
Malaysia 22 20 2 0 0 27/02/2020
Vietnam* 16 8 8 0 0 13/02/2020
Philippines* 3 3 0 0 1 05/02/2020
Cambodia* 1 1 0 0 0 30/01/2020
Thailand 40 23 7 10 0 26/02/2020
India* 3 3 0 0 0 03/02/2020
Nepal* 1 1 0 0 0 24/01/2020
Sri Lanka 1 1 0 0 0 27/01/2020
USA 59 56 2 1 0 26/02/2020
Canada 11 9 1 1 0 27/02/2020
Brazil 1 1 0 0 0 26/02/2020
Italy 400 3 121 276 12 27/02/2020
Germany 21 3 14 4 0 27/02/2020
France 18 8 7 3 2 27/02/2020
UK 13 12 1 0 0 27/02/2020
Spain 12 10 1 1 0 27/02/2020
Croatia 3 2 1 0 0 26/02/2020
Austria 2 2 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Finland 2 2 0 0 0 26/02/2020
Israel 2 2 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Russia* 2 2 0 0 0 31/01/2020
Sweden 2 2 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Belgium* 1 1 0 0 0 04/02/2020
Denmark 1 1 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Estonia† 1 0 0 1 0 27/02/2020
Georgia 1 1 0 0 0 26/02/2020
Greece 1 1 0 0 0 27/02/2020
North Macedonia 1 1 0 0 0 26/02/2020
Norway 1 1 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Romania 1 1 0 0 0 26/02/2020
Switzerland 1 1 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Iran† 141 0 28 113 22 27/02/2020
Kuwait 43 43 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Bahrain 33 33 0 0 0 26/02/2020
UAE 13 8 5 0 0 27/02/2020
Iraq 6 6 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Oman 4 4 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Lebanon 1 1 0 0 0 27/02/2020
Pakistan 2 1 0 1 0 26/02/2020
Afghanistan 1 1 0 0 0 24/02/2020
Egypt*† 1 0 1 0 0 14/02/2020
Algeria 1 1 0 0 0 25/02/2020
* Countries considered to be without an ongoing outbreak
† Countries excluded from analysis
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and obtained 500 thinned samples from 10,000 MCMC steps 
(where the first half of the chain was discarded as burn-in). We 
confirmed that the final 500 samples have an effective sample size 
of at least 300, indicating sufficiently low auto-correlation.
We also performed a joint-estimation of R0 and k by the 
MCMC method (with a weakly-informed normal prior 
N(μ = 3, σ = 5) for R0 and the weakly-informed half-normal 
prior (HalfNormal(σ = 10)) for the reciprocal of k.
Statistical analysis was implemented in R-3.6.1 with a 
package {LaplacesDemon}-16.1.1. The reproducible code for 
this study is available on GitHub14.
Proportion responsible for 80% of secondary transmissions
Using the estimated R0 and k, we computed the estimated 
proportion of infected individuals responsible for 80% of 
the total secondary transmissions. Such proportion p80% is given as 
                         80%
0
0
1 NB ; , ,
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  +   represents the probability mass of a 
negative-binomial distribution with a mean R0 and an 
overdispersion parameter k. This calculation is eased by the 
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We computed p80% for each MCMC (Markov-chain Monte 
Carlo) sample to yield median and 95% CrIs.
Model comparison with a Poisson branching process model
To test if our assumption of overdispersed offspring distribution 
better describes the data, we compared our negative-binomial 
branching process model with a Poisson branching process 
model, which assumes that the offspring distribution follows 
a Poisson distribution instead of negative-binomial. Since a 
negative-binomial distribution converges to a Poisson distri-
bution as k → ∞, we approximately implemented a Poisson 
branching process model by fixing k of the negative-binomial 
model at 1010. We compared the two models by the widely- 
applicable Bayesian information criterion (WBIC)15.
Simulation of the effect of underreporting
We used simulations to investigate potential bias caused by 
underreporting, one of the major limitations of the present 
study. Underreporting in some countries may be more 
frequent than others because of limited surveillance and/or 
testing capacity, causing heterogeneity in the number of 
cases that could have affected the estimated overdispersion. 
See Extended data (Supplementary materials)16 for detailed 
methods. 
The effect of a differential reproduction number for imported 
cases
Due to interventions targeting travellers (e.g. screening and 
quarantine), the risk of transmission from imported cases may 
be lower than that from local cases. As part of the sensitivity 
analysis in Extended data, we estimated k assuming that the 
reproduction number of imported cases is smaller than that of 
local cases.
Results
Our estimation suggested substantial overdispersion (k << 1) 
in the offspring distribution of COVID-19 (Figure 1A and 
Figure 2). Within the current consensus range of R0 (2–3), k 
was estimated to be around 0.1 (median estimate 0.1; 95% 
CrI: 0.05–0.2 for R0 = 2.5). For the R0 values of 2–3, the 
estimates suggested that 80% of secondary transmissions may 
Figure 1. MCMC estimates given assumed R0 values. (A) Estimated overdispersion parameter for various basic reproduction number R0. 
(B) The proportion of infected individuals responsible for 80% of the total secondary transmissions (p80%). The black lines show the median 
estimates given fixed R0 values and the grey shaded areas indicate 95% CrIs. The regions corresponding to the likely range of R0 (2–3) are 
indicated by colour.
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have been caused by a small fraction of infectious individuals 
(~10%; Figure 1B).
The result of the joint estimation suggested the likely bounds 
for R0 and k (95% CrIs: R0 1.4–12; k 0.04–0.2). The upper 
bound of R0 did not notably differ from that of the prior 
distribution (=13.5), suggesting that our model and the data only 
informed the lower bound of R0. This was presumably because 
the contribution of R0 to the shape of a negative-binomial 
distribution is marginal when k is small (Extended data, 
Figure S1)16. A scatterplot (Extended data, Figure S2)16 exhib-
ited a moderate correlation between R0 and k (correlation 
coefficient -0.4).
Model comparison between negative-binomial and Poisson 
branching process models suggested that a negative-binomial 
model better describes the observed data; WBIC strongly 
supported the negative-binomial model with a difference of 
11.0 (Table 2). The simulation of the effect of underreporting 
suggested that possible underreporting is unlikely to cause 
underestimation of overdispersion parameter k (Extended data, 
Figure S3)16. A slight increase in the estimate of k was observed 
when the reproduction number for imported cases was assumed 
to be lower due to interventions (Extended data, Table S1).
Discussion
Our results suggested that the offspring distribution of 
COVID-19 is highly overdispersed. For the likely range of R0 
of 2–3, the overdispersion parameter k was estimated to be 
around 0.1, suggesting that the majority of secondary transmission 
may be caused by a very small fraction of individuals 
(80% of transmissions caused by ~10% of the total cases). 
These results are consistent with a number of observed 
superspreading events observed in the current COVID-19 
outbreak17, and also in line with the estimates from the previous 
SARS/MERS outbreaks8.
The overdispersion parameter for the current COVID-19 
outbreak has also been estimated by stochastic simulation18 and 
from contact tracing data in Shenzhen, China19. The former 
study did not yield an interpretable estimate of k due to 
the limited data input. In the latter study, the estimates 
of R
e
 (the effective reproduction number) and k were 0.4 
(95% confidence interval: 0.3–0.5) and 0.58 (0.35–1.18), 
respectively, which did not agree with our findings. However, 
these estimates were obtained from pairs of cases with a clear 
epidemiological link and therefore may have been biased 
(downward for R0 and upward for k) if superspreading events 
had been more likely to be missed during the contact tracing.
Although cluster size distributions based on a branching 
process model are useful in inference of the offspring distri-
bution from limited data12,20, they are not directly applicable 
to an ongoing outbreak because the final cluster size may 
not yet have been observed. In our analysis, we adopted 
an alternative approach which accounts for possible future 
Figure 2. Possible offspring distributions of COVID-19. (A) Offspring distribution corresponding to R0 = 2.5 and k = 0.1 (median estimate). 
(B) Offspring distribution corresponding to R0 = 2.5 and k = 0.05 (95% CrI lower bound), 0.2 (upper bound). The probability mass functions 







Negative-binomial 1.4–12 0.04-0.2 45.6 0
Poisson 0.95–1.2 1010 (fixed) 56.6 11.0
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growth of clusters to minimise the risk of underestimation. 
As of 27 February 2020, the majority of the countries in 
the dataset had ongoing outbreaks (36 out of 43 countries 
analysed, accounting for 2,788 cases of the total 2,816). Even 
though we used the case counts in those countries only as the 
lower bounds of future final cluster sizes, which might have 
only partially informed of the underlying branching process, 
our model yielded estimates with moderate uncertainty levels 
(at least sufficient to suggest that k may be below 1). Together 
with the previous finding suggesting that the overdispersion 
parameter is unlikely to be biased downwards21, we believe 
our analysis supports the possibility of highly-overdispersed 
transmission of COVID-19.
A number of limitations need to be noted in this study. We used 
the confirmed case counts reported to WHO and did not account 
for possible underreporting of cases. Heterogeneities between 
countries in surveillance and intervention capacities, which 
might also be contributing to the estimated overdispersion, 
were not considered (although we investigated such effects by 
simulations; see Extended data, Figure S3)16. Reported cases 
whose site of infection classified as unknown, which should 
in principle be counted as either imported or local cases, were 
excluded from analysis. Some cases with a known site of 
infection could also have been misclassified (e.g., cases with 
travel history may have been infected locally). The distinction 
between countries with and without ongoing outbreak (7 days 
without any new confirmation of cases) was arbitrary. However, 
we believe that our conclusion is robust because the distinction 
does not change with different thresholds (4–14 days), 
within which the serial interval of SARS-CoV-2 is likely to 
fall22,23.
Our finding of a highly-overdispersed offspring distribution 
suggests that there is benefit to focusing intervention efforts on 
superspreading. As most infected individuals do not contribute 
to the expansion of transmission, the effective reproduction 
number could be drastically reduced by preventing relatively 
rare superspreading events. Identifying characteristics of settings 
that could lead to superspreading events will play a key role 
in designing effective control strategies.
Data availability
Source data
Zenodo: Extended data: Estimating the overdispersion in 
COVID-19 transmission using outbreak sizes outside China. 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.374034816.
This project contains the following source data taken from 
references 10 and 11: 
•     bycountries_27Feb2020.csv. (Imported/local case counts 
by country from WHO situation report 3810.)
•     dailycases_international_27Feb2020.csv. (Daily case counts 
by country from COVID2019.app11.)
Extended data
Zenodo: Extended data: Estimating the overdispersion in 
COVID-19 transmission using outbreak sizes outside China. 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.391157616.
This project contains the following extended data 
•     supplementarymaterials.pdf. (Supplementary material: 
Estimating the amount of superspreading using outbreak 
sizes of COVID-19 outside China.)
•     figS1.tif. (Figure S1. Offspring distributions for different 
R0 values. The probability mass functions of negative-
binomial distributions are shown. The overdispersion 
parameter k is fixed at 0.1.)
•     figS2.tif. (Supplementary Figure 2. Scatter plot of 
MCMC samples from a joint estimation of R0 and k. The 
dotted line represents the threshold R0 = 1)
•     figS3.tif. (Supplementary Figure 3. Estimates of over-
dispersion from simulations with underreporting. 
(A) Maximum-likelihood estimates (MLEs) of over-
dispersion parameter k with different distributions for 
country-specific reporting probability qi (including 
constant qi = 1). Both imported and local cases are 
assumed to be reported at probability qi in country 
i. The blue dotted line indicates the true value k = 0.1. 
(B) MLEs where imported cases were assumed to 
be fully reported and local cases were reported at 
probability qi. (C) Probability density functions for beta 
distributions used in the simulation.)
Code availability
The reproducible code is available at: https://github.com/ 
akira-endo/COVID19_clustersize.
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1. The number of imported cases is likely an underestimate of the true number of cases as
screening of travelers is unlikely to reach high detection rate for SARS-CoV-2. Certain
studies estimated the reporting rate is only around 30-40%, even for countries with high
surveillance intensity. This is likely different from the reporting rate of local cases (see










2. The over-dispersion estimated for SARS in the previous study is under un-controlled
epidemic scenario. However, for imported cases detected through travel screening,
certain control measures is likely in-place such as isolation/quarantine, which will reduce
the effective reproduction number, thus in Figure 1, the effective R0 range for imported









3. It's also quite likely that local transmission is heavily under-reported during February as
well. A way to gauge this under-detection is to see when each country reported the first
I
I I I
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well. A way to gauge this under-detection is to see when each country reported the first
few deaths due to COVID-19. Assuming an infection fatality of 1% will suggest a few
hundred cumulative infections about 2 weeks before the detection of death. The authors
already listed a number of deaths at the same date of case reporting, I recommend the
authors also reports the number of deaths 2-weeks later (or the delay from case detection
to death that the authors finds appropriate) and comment on the possible rate of under




















(Supplementary document, Section 3) An existing study suggested 38% as an optimistic global
estimate of the detection probability for imported cases from Wuhan, China, with a substantial
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1. The authors may wish to add one or two sentences about the convergence of MCMC
chains, such as the diagnosis used. 
2. If I understood correctly, a thinning interval of 10 is used to sample the raw chains. With






3. As to the statistical model, it seems that the authors assumed that all imported cases
arrived and triggered the local epidemic at the same time. If the cases arrived at different
time points, will the inferred results be different? This manuscript might be useful to
understand the effect of continuous seeding: Characterizing the dynamics underlying
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So while it is reasonable to conclude that super-spreading individuals and/or super-spreader
events are driving the majority of transmissions after mitigations are in place, it would be
incorrect to conclude that this was (as much of) the situation when there were few mitigations
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